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This paper analyzes a detailed plan to set quantitative national limits on emissions of greenhouse gases,
following along the lines of the Kyoto Protocol.   It is designed to fill in the most serious gaps:  the
absence of targets extending as far as 2100, the absence of participation by the United States and developing
countries, and the absence of reason to think that countries will abide by commitments.   The plan
elaborates on the idea of a framework of formulas that can assign quantitative limits across countries,
one budget period at a time.  Unlike other century-long paths of emission targets that are based purely
on science (concentration goals) or ethics (equal rights per capita) or economics (cost-benefit optimization),
this plan is based partly on politics.   Three political constraints are particularly important. (1) Developing
countries are not asked to bear any cost in the early years.  (2) Thereafter, they are not asked to make
any sacrifice that is different in kind or degree than was made by those countries that went before them,
with due allowance for differences in incomes.  (3) No country is asked to accept an ex ante target
that costs it more than, say, 1% of GDP in present value, or more than, say, 5% of GDP in any single
budget period.  They would not agree to ex ante targets that turned out to have such high costs, nor
abide by them ex post.   An announced target path that implies a future violation of these constraints
will not be credible, and thus will not provide the necessary signals to firms today.
The idea is that (i) China and other developing countries are asked to accept targets at BAU in the
coming budget period, the same in which the US first agrees to cuts below BAU; and (ii) all countries
are asked to make further cuts in the future in accordance with a formula which sums up a Progressive
Reductions Factor, a Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a Gradual Equalization Factor.  The paper tries
out specific values for the parameters in the formulas (parameters that govern the extent of progressivity
and equity, and the speed with which latecomers must eventually catch up).   The resulting target paths
for emissions are run through the WITCH model.   It does turn out to be possible to achieve the carbon
abatement goal (concentrations of 500 PPM in 2100) while simultaneously obeying the economic/political
constraint (no country suffers a disproportionate loss in GDP).    Preliminary efforts to achieve a target
of 450 ppm have so far been unable to do so without violating the cost constraint.
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                                       Global Climate Policy Architecture: 
Specific Formulas and Emission Targets for All Countries in All Decades 
 
 
This paper analyzes a framework of formulas that produce precise numerical 
targets for emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) in all regions of the world in all decades of 
this century.     The formulas are based on pragmatic judgments about what is possible 
politically.   The reason for this approach is a belief that many of the usual science-based, 
ethics-based, and economics-based paths are not dynamically consistent: That is, it is not 
credible that successor governments will be able to abide by the commitments that 
today’s leaders make.    
The formulas analyzed here are driven by seven political axioms:   
1.  The United States will not commit to quantitative targets if China and other major 
developing countries do not commit to quantitative targets at the same time, due 
to concerns about economic competitiveness and carbon leakage. 
2.  China and other developing countries in the very short run will not make 
economic sacrifices, especially because the United States has not done so. 
3.  China and other developing countries, even in the longer run, will not make 
sacrifices different in character from those made by richer countries that have 
gone before them. 
4.  In the long run, no country can be rewarded for having “ramped up” its emissions 
well above 1990 levels before joining. 
5.  No country will agree to participate if its expected cost during the course of the 
21
st century (in present discounted value) is more than Y, where Y is for now set at 
1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). 
6.  No country will abide by targets that cost it more than X in any particular period, 
where X is for now set at 5 percent of GDP. 
7.  If one major country drops out, others will become discouraged and the system 
may unravel. 
 
The targets are formulated assuming the following framework.   Between now and 
2050, the European Union follows the path laid out in the January 2008 European 
Commission Directive; the United States follows the path in recent legislative bills 
associated with Senator Joseph Lieberman; and Japan, Australia and Korea follow 
statements that their own leaders have recently made.  China, India and other countries 
agree immediately to quantitative greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets, which in the 
first decades merely copy their business-as-usual (BAU) paths, thereby precluding 
leakage.  These countries are not initially expected to cut emissions below their BAU 
trajectory.   
When the time comes for these countries to join mitigation efforts—perhaps when 
they cross certain thresholds—their emission targets are determined using a formula that 
incorporates three elements: a Progressive Reductions Factor, a Latecomer Catch-up 
Factor, and a Gradual Equalization Factor.   These factors are designed to persuade the 
developing countries that they are only being asked to do what is fair in light of actions 
already taken by others.   In the second half of the century, the formula that determines 
the emissions path for industrialized countries is dominated by the Gradual Equalization   3
Factor.   But developing countries, which will still be in earlier stages of participation and 
thus will have departed from their BAU paths only relatively recently, will still follow in 
the footsteps of those who have gone before.  This means that their emission targets will 
be set using the Progressive Reductions Factor and the Latecomer Catch-up Factor, in 
addition to the Gradual Equalization Factor.   The glue that holds the agreement together 
is that every country has reason to feel that it is only doing its fair share. 
 
We use the WITCH model to analyze the results of this approach in terms of  
projected paths for emissions targets, permit trading, the price of carbon, GDP costs, and 
environmental effects.  Overall economic costs, discounted (at 5 percent), average 0.24 
percent of GDP.  No country suffers a discounted loss of more than 1 percent of GDP 
overall from the agreement, nor more than 5 percent of GDP in any given period.   
Atmospheric CO2 concentrations level off at 500 parts per million (ppm) in the latter part 




There are by now many plans for a post-Kyoto climate change regime, even if one 
considers only those that accept the basic Kyoto approach of quantitative, national-level 
limits on GHG emissions accompanied by international trade in emissions permits.   The 
Kyoto targets applied only to the budget period 2008–2012, which is now upon us, and 
only to a minority of countries (in theory, the industrialized countries).    The big task is 
to extend quantitative emissions targets through the remainder of the century and to other 
countries—especially the United States, China, and other developing countries. 
 
Virtually all the other plans for a post-Kyoto agreement are either based on 
scientific environmental objectives (e.g., stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 
450 ppm in 2100), ethical or philosophical considerations  (e.g., the principle that every 
individual on earth has equal emission rights), or economic cost-benefit analyses 
(weighing the economic costs of abatement against the long-term environmental 
benefits).
1   This paper analyzes a path of emission targets for all countries and for the 
remainder of the century that is intended to be more practical than others that have been 
put forward, in that it is also based on political considerations, rather than on science or 
ethics or economics alone.
2 
 
The industrialized countries did, in 1997, agree to quantitative emissions targets 
for the Kyoto Protocol’s first budget period, so in some sense we know that it can be 
done.  But the obstacles are enormous.  For starters, most of the Kyoto signers will 
probably miss their 2008–2012 targets, and of course the United States never even 
                                                 
1  An important example of the science-based approach is Wigley (2007).  An important example 
of the cost-benefit-based approach is Nordhaus (1994, 2006).   An important example of the 
rights-based approach is Baer et al. (2008). 
2 Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins (2003) and Victor (2004) review a number of existing proposals.   
Numerous others have offered their own thoughts on post-Kyoto plans, at varying levels of detail, 
including Aldy, Orszag, and Stiglitz (2001); Barrett (2006); Nordhaus (2006); and Olmstead and 
Stavins (2006).     4
ratified.  At multilateral venues such as the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Bali (2007) and the Group of Eight (G8) meeting 
in Hokkaido (July 2008), world leaders have (just barely) been able to agree on a broad 
long-term goal of cutting total global emissions in half by 2050.   But these meetings did 
not come close to producing agreement on who will cut how much, not to mention 
agreement on multilateral targets within a near-enough time horizon that the same 
national leaders are likely to still be alive when the abatement commitment comes due.  
To quote Al Gore (1993, p.353), “politicians are often tempted to mke a promise that is 
not binding and hpe for some unexpectedly easy way to keep the promise.”  For this 
reason, the aggregate targets endorsed so far cannot be viewed as anything more than 
aspirational.  
 
Moreover, nobody has ever come up with an enforcement mechanism that 
simultaneously has sufficient teeth and is acceptable to member countries.  Given the 
importance countries place on national sovereignty it is unlikely that this will change.
3  
Hopes must instead rest on weak enforcement mechanisms such as the power of moral 
suasion and international opprobrium.  It is safe to say that in the event of a clash 
between such weak enforcement mechanisms and the prospect of a large economic loss 
to a particular country, aversion to the latter would win out. 
 
 
Necessary aspects of a workable successor to Kyoto 
 
I have suggested six attributes
4 that any successor-agreement to the Kyoto 
Protocol would have to deliver:    
 
•  More comprehensive participation—specifically, getting the United States, China, 
and other developing counties to join the system of quantitative emission targets. 
•  Efficiency—incorporating market-flexibility mechanisms such as international permit 
trading and providing advance signals to allow the private sector to plan ahead, to the 
extent compatible with the credibility of the signals. 
•  Dynamic consistency—addressing the problem that announcements about steep cuts 
in 2050 are not credible.  The lack of credibility stems from two sources.  First, it is 
known that today’s leaders cannot bind their successors.  Second, the projected failure 
of most Kyoto signatories to meet their first-period emission targets makes the lack of 
seriousness at a global level painfully obvious. 
•  Equity—developing countries point out that industrialized countries created the 
problem of global climate change, while poor countries account for only about 20 
percent of the CO2 that has accumulated in the atmosphere from industrial activity 
over the past 150 years (though admittedly this is changing rapidly).  From an equity 
standpoint, developing countries argue that it is not appropriate to ask them to limit 
                                                 
3 The possibility of trade sanctions is probably the only serious proposal for penalizing non-
participation.  But such penalties are not currently being considered at the multilateral level.   
(See Frankel, 2009, however, and references therein). 
4  Frankel (2007).  Similar lists are provided by Bowles and Sandalow (2001), Stewart and 
Weiner (2003), and others.   5
their economic development to pay for a climate-change solution; moreover, they do 
not have the capacity to pay for emissions abatement that richer countries do.  Finally, 
many developing countries place greater priority on raising their people’s current 
standard of living (including reducing local air and water pollution).   These countries 
might reasonably demand quantitative targets that reflect an equal per capita 
allotment of emissions, on equity grounds, even waiving any claims to reparations for 
the disproportionate environmental damages that can be expected to fall on them.  
•  Compliance —recognizing that no country will join a treaty if it entails tremendous 
economic sacrifice and that therefore compliance cannot be reasonably expected if 
costs are too high.   Similarly, no country, if it has already joined the treaty, will 
continue to stay in during any given period if staying in means huge economic 
sacrifice, relative to dropping out, in that period. 
•  Robustness under uncertainty—recognizing that the relationship between cost and 
compliance applies not just to ex ante calculations based on current expectations, but 
also ex post, when future growth rates and other uncertain economic and 
technological variables become known. 
 
 
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the plan analyzed in this paper brings all countries into an 
international policy regime on a realistic basis and looks far into the future.   But we 
cannot pretend to see with as fine a degree of resolution at a century-long horizon as we 
can at a five- or ten-year horizon.  Fixing precise numerical targets a century ahead is 
impractical.  Rather, we need a century-long sequence of negotiations, fitting within a 
common institutional framework that builds confidence as it goes along.   The framework 
must have enough continuity so that success in the early phases builds members’ 
confidence in each other’s compliance commitments and in the fairness, viability, and 
credibility of the process.   Yet the framework must be flexible enough that it can 
accommodate the unpredictable fluctuations in economic growth, technology 
development, climate, and political sentiment that will inevitably occur.   Only by 
striking the right balance between continuity and flexibility are there grounds for hope 
that a framework for addressing climate change would last a century or more.   
 
An example of such a framework in another policy area is the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, which emerged after World War II and provided the basis for 50 years 
of successful multilateral negotiations to liberalize international trade, culminating in the 
founding of the World Trade Organization.   Nobody at the beginning could have 
predicted the precise magnitude or sequence of reforms to various trade barriers, or what 
sectors or countries would be included.   But the early stages of negotiation worked, and 
so confidence in the process built, more and more countries joined the club, and 
progressively more ambitious rounds of liberalization were achieved.    
Another analogy would be with the process of European economic integration, 
culminating in the formation of the European Economic and Monetary Union.   Despite 
ambitions for more comprehensive integration, nobody at the time of the founding of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, or the subsequent European Economic 
Community, could have forecast the speed, scope, magnitude, or country membership   6
that this path of integration would eventually take.   The idea would be to do the same 
with the UNFCCC. 
 
 
 Political constraints 
 
This paper takes as axiomatic the following six claims regarding political 
feasibility. 
1.  The United States will not commit to quantitative targets if China and other major 
developing countries do not commit to quantitative targets at the same time, though 
this leaves completely open the initial level and future path of the targets.  Any plan 
will be found unacceptable if it leaves the less developed countries free to exploit 
their lack of GHG regulation for “competitive” advantage at the expense of the 
participating countries’ economies and leads to emissions leakage at the expense of 
the environmental goal.  
2.  China, India, and other developing countries will not make sacrifices they view as 
a.  fully contemporaneous with rich countries, 
b.  different in character from those made by richer countries who have gone 
before them, 
c.  preventing them from industrializing, 
d.  failing to recognize that richer countries are in a position to make greater 
economic sacrifices than poor countries to address the problem (all the more 
so because rich countries’ past emissions have created the problem), or 
e.  failing to recognize that the rich countries have benefited from an “unfair 
advantage” in being allowed to achieve levels of per capita emissions that are 
far above those of the poor countries. 
3.  In the short run, emission targets for developing countries must be computed relative 
to current levels or BAU paths; otherwise the economic costs will be too great for the 
countries in question to accept.
 5  But in the longer run, no country can be rewarded 
for having "ramped up” emissions far above 1990 levels, the reference year agreed to 
at Rio and Kyoto.  Fairness considerations aside, if post-1990 increases are 
permanently “grandfathered,” then countries that have not yet agreed to cuts will have 
a strong incentive to ramp up emissions in the interval before they join.  Of course 
there is nothing magic about 1990 but, for better or worse, it is the year on which 
Annex I countries have long based planning. 
4.  No country will accept a path of targets that is expected to cost it more than Y percent 
of GDP throughout the 21
st century (in present discounted value), where Y is for now 
set at 1 percent. 
5.  No country will accept targets in any period that are expected to cost more than X 
percent of GDP to achieve during that period; alternatively, even if targets were 
already in place, no country  will in the future actually abide by them if it finds the 
cost to do so would exceed X percent of GDP.  In this paper, GDP losses are defined 
relative to what would happen if the country in question had never joined. An 
alternative would be to define GDP losses in a future period relative to what would 
                                                 
5  Cuts expressed relative to BAU have been called “Action Targets” (Baumert and Goldberg 2006).   7
happen if the country were to drop out in that period, after decades of participation.   
For now, I set X at 5 percent. 
6.  If one major country drops out, others will become discouraged and may also fail to 
meet their own targets, and the framework may unravel.  If such unraveling in a 
future decade is foreseeable at the time that long-run commitments are made, then 
those commitments will not be credible from the start.   Firms, consumers, and 
researchers base their current decisions to invest in plant and equipment, consumer 
durables, or new technological possibilities on the expected future price of carbon: If 
government commitments are not credible from the start, then they will not raise the 
expected future carbon price. The reason for this political approach is the belief that 
many emissions pathways designed on the basis of scientific or economic analyses 
are not dynamically consistent: That is, it is not credible that successor governments 
will be able to abide by the commitments that today’s leaders make. 
 
Squaring the circle 
 
Of the above propositions, even the first and second alone seem to add up to a 
hopeless “Catch-22”: Nothing much can happen without the United States, the United 
States will not proceed unless China and other developing countries start at the same 
time, and China will not start until after the rich countries have gone first.   
There is only one possible solution, only one knife-edge position that satisfies the 
constraints.   At the same time that the United States agrees to binding emission cuts in 
the manner of Kyoto, China and other developing countries agree to a path that 
immediately imposes on them binding emission targets—but these targets in their early 
years simply follow the BAU path.   The idea of committing to only BAU targets in the 
early decades will provoke outrage from both environmentalists on one side and business 
interests in developed countries on the other.  But both sides might come to realize that 
this commitment is far more important than it sounds:  It precludes the carbon leakage 
which, absent such an agreement, will undermine the environmental goal and it 
moderates the competitiveness concerns of carbon-intensive industries in the rich 
countries.  This approach recognizes that it would be irrational for China to agree to 
substantial actual cuts in the short term.   Indeed China might well react with outrage at 
being asked to take on binding targets of any kind at the same time as the United States.   
But China may also come to realize that it would actually gain from such an agreement,
6  
by acquiring the ability to sell emission permits at the same world market price as 
developed countries (as opposed to the lower prices China has received for lower-quality 
project credits under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism [CDM] or 
joint implementation [JI] provisions).   
 
                                                 
6 A number of authors have pointed out that developing countries actually stand to gain economically in the 
short run by accepting targets and then selling permits, including the Council of Economic Advisers (1998), 
Keohane and Raustiala (2008), and Seidman and Lewis (2009).    Of course this only works when the 
permits allocated to developing countries are sufficiently generous (i.e., do not reflect a significant 
abatement obligation), as is reasonable in the short run, but which the developing countries cannot expect 
in the long run.   8
In later decades, the formulas do ask substantially more of the developing 
countries.  But these formulas also obey basic notions of fairness, by (1) asking for cuts 
that are analogous in magnitude to the cuts made by others who began abatement earlier 
and (2) making due allowance for developing countries’ low per capita income and 
emissions and for their baseline of rapid growth.   These ideas were developed in earlier 
papers (see Frankel 1999, 2005, and 2007 and Aldy and Frankel 2004) where I suggest 
that the formulas used to develop emissions targets incorporate four or five variables: 
1990 emissions, emissions in the year of the negotiation, population, and income.  One 
might perhaps also include a few other special variables such as whether the country in 
question has coal or hydroelectric power, though the 1990 level of emissions conditional 
on per capita income can largely capture these special variables. 
 
Here we narrow down the broad family of formulas to a more manageable set, 
and then put them into operation to produce specific numerical targets for all countries, 
for all five-year budget periods of the 21
st century.   The formulas are made precise 
through the development of three factors: a short-term Progressive Reductions Factor, a 
medium-term Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a long-run Gradual Equalization Factor.   
The result is a set of actual numerical targets for all countries for the remainder of the 
century (presented in Table 1).   These are then fed into the WITCH model, by Valentina 
Bosetti, a co-author of that model, to see the economic and environmental consequences.  
International trading plays an important role. The framework is flexible enough that one 
can tinker with a parameter here or there—for example if the economic cost borne by a 
particular country is deemed too high or the environmental progress deemed too low—
without having to abandon the entire formulas framework. 
 
Emission targets for all countries: rules to guide the formulas 
 
All developing countries that have any ability to measure emissions would be 
asked to agree in 2010 to emission targets that do not exceed their projected BAU 
baseline trajectory going forward.   The objective of getting developing countries 
committed to these targets would be to forestall emissions leakage and to limit the extent 
to which their firms enjoy a competitive advantage over carbon-constrained competitors 
in the countries that have already agreed to targets below BAU under the Kyoto Protocol.   
(We expect that the developing countries would, in most cases, receive payments for 
permits and thus emit less than their BAU baseline.)    Most countries in Africa would 
probably be exempted for some decades from any kind of commitment, even to BAU 
targets, until they had better capacity to monitor emissions. 
 
One must acknowledge that BAU paths are neither easily ascertained nor 
immutable.  Countries may “high-ball” their BAU estimates in order to get more 
generous targets.  Even assuming that estimates are unbiased, important unforeseen 
economic and technological developments could occur between 2010 and 2020 that will 
shift the BAU trajectory for the 2020s, for example.   Any number of unpredictable 
events have already occurred in the years since 1990; they include German reunification, 
the 1997–1998 East Asia crisis, the boom in the BRIC countries up until 2008 (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China), the sharp rise in world oil prices up until 2008, and the world   9
financial crisis of 2007–2009.   A first measure to deal with the practical difficulty of 
setting the BAU path is to specify in the Kyoto-successor treaty that estimates must be 
generated by an independent international expert body, not by national authorities.  A 
second measure, once the first has been assured, is to provide for updates of the BAU 
paths every decade.  To omit such a provision—that is, to hold countries for the rest of 
the century to the paths that had been estimated in 2010—would in practice virtually 
guarantee that any country that achieves very high economic growth rates in the future 
will eventually drop out of the agreement, because staying in would mean incurring costs 
far in excess of 5 percent of GDP.    Allowing for periodic adjustments to the BAU 
baseline does risk undermining the incentive for carbon-saving investments, on the logic 
that such investments would reduce future BAU paths and thus reduce future target 
allocations.  This risk is the same as the risk of encouraging countries to ramp up their 
emissions, which we specified above to be axiomatically ruled out by any viable 
framework.  That is why the formula gives decreasing weight to BAU in later budget 
periods and why I introduce a Latecomer Catch-up Factor (explained below), which 
tethers all countries to their 1990 emission levels in the medium run. 
 
Countries are expected to agree to the next step, quantitative targets that entail 
specific cuts below BAU, at a time determined by their circumstances.  In our initial 
simulations, the choice of year for introducing an obligation to actually cut emissions was 
generally guided by two thresholds: when a country’s average per capita income exceeds 
$3000 per year and/or when its per capita annual emissions approach 1 ton or more.
7    
But we found that starting dates had to be further modified in order to satisfy our 
constraints regarding the distribution of economic losses. 
 
  As already noted, this approach assigns emission targets in a way that is more 
sensitive to political realities than is typical of other target paths which are constructed 
either on the basis of a cost-benefit optimization or to deliver a particular environmental 
and/or ethical goal.   Specifically, numerical targets are based (a) on commitments that 
political leaders in various key countries have already announced, as of early 2009, and 
(b) on formulas designed to assure latecomer countries that the emission cuts they are 
being asked to make represent no more than their fair share, in that they correspond to the 
sacrifices that other countries before them have already made.    
Finally comes the other important concession to practical political realities:  If the 
simulation in any period turns out to impose on any country an economic cost of more 
than X% of GDP (where X is for the purposes of this analysis is taken to be 5 percent), we 
assume that this country drops out.  Dropping out could involve either explicit 
renunciation of the treaty or massive failure to meet the quantitative targets.  For now, 
our assumption is that in any such scenario, other countries would follow by dropping out 
one by one, and the whole scheme would eventually unravel.
8   This unraveling would 
                                                 
7 Baer et al. (2008) suggest an income threshold of $7,500 per person per year.   
8 A good topic for future efforts to extend this research is to apply game theory, allowing some relatively 
less important countries to drop out without necessarily sinking the whole scheme.   That is, if the 
economic damage to remaining members arising from the defections, and the environmental damage, were 
not too great, remaining countries might continue to participate rather than retaliate by likewise dropping 
out.   10
occur much earlier if private actors rationally perceived that at some point in the future 
major players will face such high economic costs that compliance will break down.  In 
this case, the future carbon prices that are built into most models’ compliance trajectories 
will lack credibility, private actors will not make investment decisions that reflect those 
prices today,  based on them, and the effort will fail in the first period.  Therefore, our 
approach to any scenario in which any major player suffers economic losses greater than 
X% would be to go back and adjust some of the parameters of the emission formulas, so 
that costs are lower and this is no longer the case. 
  We hope by these mechanisms to achieve political viability: non-negative 
economic gains in the early years for developing countries, average costs over the course 
of the century below 1 percent of GDP per annum, and protection for every country 
against losses in any period as large, or larger than, 5 percent of GDP.  Only if they 
achieve political viability are announcements of future cuts credible.  And only credible 
announcements  of future cuts will send firms the long-term price signals and incentives 
needed to guide investment decisions today. 
 
Guidelines from policies and goals already announced by national leaders 
 
  Our model produces country-specific numeric emission targets for every fifth 
year: 2012, 2017, 2022, etc.  For each five-year budget period, such as the Kyoto period 
2008–2012, computations are based on the average of the starting year and ending year. 
 
The European Union.  The EU emissions target for 2008–2012 was agreed at 
Kyoto:  8 percent below 1990 levels.  In the second 2015–2020 period (for simplicity we 
choose the year 2017), the EU target is the one that Brussels announced in January 2008 
and confirmed in December 2008:
9 namely, 20 percent below 1990 levels.   On the one 
hand, as with other targets publicly supported by politicians in Europe and elsewhere, 
skepticism is appropriate regarding EU member countries’ willingness to make the 
sacrifices necessary to achieve this target.
10  On the other hand, however, the European 
Union’s commitment to this number was not conditional on other countries joining in.  
Indeed the European Union has said it would cut emissions 30 percent below 1990 levels 
if other countries joined in.  So in this sense we are being conservative in choosing the 20 
percent target. For the third period (2022–2027), and thereafter up to the eighth period 
(2048–2052), the EU targets progress in equal increments to a 50 percent cut below 1990 
levels: In other words, targets relative to 1990 emissions start at 25 percent below, and 
then progress to 30 percent, 35 percent, 40 percent, 45 percent, and 50 percent below. 
 
                                                 
9 Financial Times, Jan. 2, 2009, p.5. 
10  It is not entirely clear that even Europe will meet its Kyoto targets.  Perhaps the European Union will 
need to cover its shortfall with purchases of emission permits from other countries.   European emissions 
were reduced in the early 1990s by coincidental events: Britain moved away from coal under Margaret 
Thatcher and Germany with reunification in 1990 acquired dirty power plants that were easy to clean up.  
But Americans who claim on this basis that the European Union has not yet taken any serious steps go too 
far.   Ellerman and Buchner (2007, 26-29) show that the difference between allocations and emissions in 
2005 and 2006 was probably in part attributable to abatement measures implemented in response to the 
positive price of carbon.     11
  Japan, Canada, and New Zealand.  These three countries are assigned the Kyoto 
goal of a 6 percent reduction below 1990 levels.  Of all ratifiers, Canada is probably the 
farthest from achieving its Kyoto goal.
11  But Japan dominates this country grouping in 
size.  We assume that by 2010 the United States has taken genuine measures, which helps 
motivate these three countries to get more serious than they have been to date.  In a small 
concession to realism, we assume that they do not hit the numerical target until 2012 
(versus hitting it on average over the 2008–2012 budget period).
12 
  Japan’s then-Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, on June 9, 2008, announced a 
decision to cut Japanese emissions 60–80 percent by mid-century.
13  We interpret these 
targets as cuts of 10 percent every five years between 2010 and 2050, computed 
logarithmically.  The cumulative cuts are 80 percent in logarithmic terms, or 51 percent 
in absolute terms (i.e., to 49 percent of the year–2010 emissions level). 
 
  The United States.  A series of bills to cap US GHG emissions were introduced in 
Congress in 2007 and early 2008.
14  It is possible that some version of such legislation 
might pass by 2010.   
The Bingaman–Specter bill would have reduced emissions to 2006 levels by 2020 
and to 1990 levels by 2030, but with a cap or “safety valve” on the price of carbon.  The 
Lieberman–Warner bill was more aggressive.
15   It would have begun by reducing 
emissions in 2012 to below 2005 levels and would have tightened the emissions cap 
gradually each year thereafter, such that by the year 2050, total emissions would be held 
to 30 percent of 2012 levels—in other words, a 70 percent reduction from emissions 
levels at the start date of the policy.
16  If such a bill were not passed until 2010 or so, the 
goal of achieving 2005 levels by 2012 (let alone a 4 percent reduction) would for all 
practical purposes be impossible to achieve.  The bill’s sponsors would have to adjust 
2012 to BAU levels, which are projected to be 39 percent above 1990 levels, or 33 
percent logarithmically (i.e., 1990 emissions were 28 percent below current 2012 BAU 
projections), so the 2050 target would be 42 percent below 1990 levels.
17   A slightly 
revised “manager’s” version of the Lieberman–Warner bill earned significant 
congressional support in June 2008:  Though it did not garner a large enough majority to 
become law, the vote was widely considered an important step forward politically for the 
                                                 
11  The current government’s plan calls for reducing Canadian emissions in 2020 by 20 percent below 2006 
levels (which translates to 2.7 percent below 1990 levels) and in 2050 by 60–70 percent below 2006 levels.   
(“FACTBOX – Greenhouse gas curbs from Australia to India,” Sept.5, 2008, Reuters.  
www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L5649578.htm.) 
12   In 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe supported an initiative to half global emissions by 2050.  
(Financial Times,  May 25).  But ahead of the 2008 G8 Summit, Japan declined to match the EU’s 
commitment to cut its emissions 20 per cent by 2020 (FT, April 24, 2008, p.3). 
13 “Japan Pledges Big Cut in Emissions,” FT, June 10, 2008 p.6; 
14  The bills are conveniently summarized in Table 1A in Hufbauer, Charnovitz and Kim (2009). 
15 S. 2191: America's Climate Security Act of 2007 
16  Section 1201, pages 30-32.  (The percentage is measured non-logarithmically.) 
17  See, for  example, 
http://theclimategroup.org/index.php/news_and_events/news_and_comment/carbon_trading_high_hopes_for_lieberman_warner/  (The number is 
54 percent, measured logarithmically.  This is the preferred way of defining percentage changes, because a 
50 percent increase in emissions followed by a 50 percent reduction gets you back where you started from.   
Logarithms are too technical for non-specialist audiences.   But measuring changes non-logarithmically has 
the undesirable property that a 50 percent increase [to 1.50] followed by a 50 percent reduction [to 0.75] 
does not get you back to your starting point [1.00].)   12
activist camp.  It was presumed that a new bill in the next session would probably look 
similar and, with a new president, would have better chances of success.
18 
If taken at face value, with 2012 emissions returned to 2005 levels or lower, then 
the Lieberman–Warner targets would shave off another 13 percent from the target path, 
so that emissions in 2050 would be 55 percent below 1990 levels.
19   There are three 
respects in which it might be naïve to accept these political aspirations at face value.  
First, it is not realistic to think that the United States could go from the steady emission 
growth rates of 1990–2007 (when emissions increased, on average, by 1.4 percent per 
year) to immediate rapid cuts, without passing through an intermediate phase of slowing, 
and then peaking or plateauing, before reversing (a trajectory some have called “slow-
stop-reverse”).  Second is the point that many voters and politicians who have supported 
recent bills in Congress will be unlikely to support the measures that would be needed to 
attain the targets contained in those bills in an economically efficient way—that is, by 
raising the price of fossil fuels through such measures as a carbon tax or tradable permits.  
Third, the Lieberman–Warner target is somewhat more aggressive than Europe’s goal, 
measured relative to 1990 emissions, and implies a much more aggressive rate of 
emissions decline than Europe’s over the period 2012–2050.  So far, American support 
for serious action has lagged behind Europe’s.  
On the other hand, if China and other developing countries accept quantitative 
targets, as foreseen under this plan, this will boost domestic American support for tough 
action.   In addition, one could argue that there is more “fat” in US emissions, so one 
expects that it would be easier to achieve reductions than in Europe or Japan.   The 
terminal level of emissions in 2050 under the formula would still probably be 
substantially higher than Europe’s, relative to population or GDP. 
We assume that the average annual emissions growth rate is cut in half during the 
period 2008–2012, to 0.7 percent per year or 3.5 percent cumulatively, so that emissions 
in 2012 are 31.5 percent above 1990 levels.
20 At that point, we assume emissions plateau 
(growth is held to zero) for the period 2012–2017.  Then we implement the rest of the 
Lieberman–Warner formula, such that emissions in 2050 reach a level that is 67 percent 
below 1990 levels.   Using our postponed base this is 98.5 percent below 2012 levels, 
logarithmically.  Spread over 38 years, this implies sustained reductions of 2.6 percent 
per year on average, or 13 percent every five years (which is a more aggressive rate of 
reduction than Lieberman–Warner).     
 
Australia.   Canberra has been reluctant to take strong actions because the country 
is so dependent on coal.   In July of 2008, however, Australian Prime Minister Kevin 
                                                 
18 This paper was originally written during the 2008 US presidential election campaign, in which both 
major presidential candidates supported GHG reduction measures along the lines of recent congressional 
bills.  John McCain advocated a 2050 emissions target of 60 percent below 1990 levels, or 66 percent 
below 2005 levels, close to Lieberman–Warner (Washington Post, May 13, 2008, p. A14; and FT, May 13, 
2008, p.4).  Barack Obama endorsed a more aggressive target of reducing 2050 emissions 80 percent below 
1990 levels (FT, Oct. 17, 2008). 
19 That is 67 percent logarithmically.   Or a cut of about 62 percent according to J.R. Pegg, Environmental 
News Service, October 2007. 
20  That is, 27 percent logarithmically.   13
Rudd announced plans to cut emissions to 60 percent below 2000 levels by 2050.
21   In 
the regional groupings of our model, Australia is classified together with South Korea 
and South Africa. 
 
Korea and South Africa.  Until recently it looked unlikely that any “non-Annex 
I” countries would consider taking on serious cuts below a BAU growth path within the 
next decade.   But in March 2008, the new president of South Korea, Myung-bak Lee, 
“tabled a plan to cap emissions at current levels over the first Kyoto period.”
22   This was 
an extraordinarily ambitious target in light of Korea’s economic growth rate.   He also 
“vowed his country would slash emissions in half by 2050,”
23 like the industrialized 
countries—of which Korea is now one.   Emissions have risen 90 percent since 1990 and 
it is hard to imagine any country applying the brakes so sharply as to switch instantly 
from 5 percent annual growth in emissions to zero.
24   Perhaps President Lee thinks he 
can offset growth in South Korean emissions by paying North Korea to reforest.   We 
choose to interpret the Korean plan to flatten emissions as covering a period that stretches 




Meanwhile, South African officials evidently announced in 2008 that its 
emissions would peak by 2025 and begin declining by 2030.
 26   
 
China.  Getting China to agree to binding commitments is the sine qua non of any 
successful post-Kyoto plan.   Evidently China has announced plans to start cutting GHG 
emissions in 2030.  Presumably that means relative to BAU, rather than in absolute 
terms.
27   Of course 2030 is later than industrialized countries would like.   The country is 
expected to cross the threshold of 1 ton of emissions per capita around 2014 and the 
threshold of $3000 in annual per capita income by 2022.  A standard five- or ten-year lag 
between treaty signing and budget period would point to a first-cuts budget period around 
2024–2027.   But persuading Beijing to move the 2030 date up by five years is not as 
                                                 
21 A July 16, 2008, government “green paper,” Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, reported details on 
implementation via a domestic cap-and-trade program.  Rudd’s initiative appears to have domestic political 
support   (The Economist, July 26, 2008, p.52).  The government went on to set a target for 2020 of 15 
percent above 1990 levels (FT, Jan. 2, 2009, p.5), or 5 per cent below 2000 levels, with the prospect of a 
further 10 percent revision if other countries also sign on to stronger reductions (ABC News Australia 
online, Dec. 15, 2008). 
22 “South Korea Plans to Cap Emissions,” International Herald Tribune, March 21, 2008.   
23  “South Korea: Developing Countries Move Toward Targets,” Lisa Friedman, ClimateWire, Oct. 3, 2008. 
24  This did not stop some environmental groups from criticizing the plan as not sufficiently ambitious.   
Such criticisms may give political leaders second thoughts about announcing any specific measures at all, 
as opposed to sticking with banal generalities. 
25 One could note, first, that President Lee came to office setting a variety of ambitious goals beyond his 
power to bring about, especially for economic growth, and second that his popularity quickly plummeted.  
At the time of writing, his ability to persuade his countrymen to take serious measures was in question.    
26 ClimateWire, Oct.3, 2008, op cit.  Admittedly, statements from environmental or foreign ministries do 
not necessarily carry a lot of weight, if they have not been vetted by finance or economics ministries let 
alone issued by heads of government or approved by parliaments.   An example would be Argentina’s 
announcement of a target in 1998. 
27 This was China’s position in talks near Berlin with five big emerging nations (China, India, South Africa, 
Brazil and Mexico), ahead of the June 2007 G8 summit in Germany, according to Germany’s environment 
minister ( FT 3/12/07).   14
critical as persuading it to accept some quantitative target in 2010, even if that target only 
reflects BAU.  The reason is that if China does not adopt some binding target in the near 
term, the United States and most developing countries won’t join, and then the entire 
enterprise will be undone.     
 
The key questions thus become (1) how to determine the magnitude of China’s 
cuts in its first budget period—that is, for the first period in which it is asked to make cuts 
below BAU; (2) how to determine Korea’s cuts in its second budget period; and (3) how 
to set targets for everyone else.   (The other regions are Latin America—whose stage of 
development logically implies  going after Korea but before China —Russia, Middle 
East/North Africa, Southeast Asia, India/South Asia, and Africa.)  Our general guiding 
principle is to ask countries only to do what is analogous to what has been done by others 
who have gone before them.    To put this general principle into practice, we apply three 
factors.     
 
Guidelines for formulas that ask developing countries to accept “fair” targets, 
analogous to those who have gone before 
 
This section discusses three factors for determining “fair” emissions targets for 
developing countries.  The three factors are additive (logarithmically). 
We call the first the Progressive Reductions Factor.  It is based on the pattern of 
emission reductions (relative to BAU) assigned to countries under the Kyoto Protocol, as 
a function of income per capita. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 1, which comes from 
the data as they were reported at that time.  Other things equal, richer countries are asked 
to make more severe cuts relative to BAU, the status quo from which they are departing 
in the first period.   Specifically, each 1 percent difference in income per capita, measured 
relative to EU income in 1997, increases the abatement obligation by 0.14 percent, where 
the abatement obligation is measured in terms of reductions from BAU relative to the EU 
cuts agreed at Kyoto.   Normally, at least in their early budget periods, most countries’ 
incomes will be below what the Europeans had in 1997, so that this factor dictates milder 
cuts relative to BAU than Europe made at Kyoto.  In fact the resulting targets are likely to 
reflect a “growth path”—that is, they will allow for actual emission increases relative to 
the preceding periods.  The formula is:  
 
PRF  expressed as country cuts vs. BAU   
 =   EU's Kyoto commitment for 2008 relative to its BAU + .14 * (gap between the country’s  
income per capita and the EU’s 2007 income per capita).   
 
The parameter (0.14) was suggested ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates on 
the data shown in Figure 1.     Other parameters could be chosen instead, if the parties to 
a new agreement wanted to increase or decrease the degree of progressivity. 
   15
Figure 1:   The Emissions Cuts Agreed at Kyoto Were  
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The Latecomer Catch-up Factor is the second element in the formula.  
Latecomers are defined as those countries that have not ratified Kyoto or for which Kyoto 
did not set quantitative targets. (Perhaps it would also include those like Canada that 
ratified the treaty but, based on current trends, are not expected to meet the goal.)   The 
formula would be badly designed if it  rewarded these countries by permanently 
readjusting their targets to a higher baseline.  Aside from notions of fairness, such re-
basing would give all latecomers an incentive to ramp up their emissions before signing 
on to binding targets, or at a minimum would undercut any socially-conscious incentives 
they might otherwise introduce to reduce emissions unilaterally in the time period before 
they join the system.   Thus the Latecomer Catch-up factor is designed to gradually close 
the gap between the starting point of the latecomers and their 1990 emission levels.   It is 
parameterized according to the numbers implicit in the Lieberman bill to bring US 
emissions to 70 percent below 1990 levels by 2050 and the Lee goal to flatten South 
Korea’s emissions over a period beginning in 2008.  In other words, countries are asked 
to move gradually in the direction of 1990 emissions in the same way that the United 
States and Korea under current plans will have done before them.   16
The formula for a country’s Latecomer Catch-up Factor (LCF) is as follows.  
Further percentage cuts (relative to BAU plus a Progressive Reductions Factor) are 
proportional to how far emissions have been allowed to rise above 1990 levels by the 
time the country joins in.  That is, it is given by: 
      LCF = α + λ percentage gap between country’s lagged emissions and 1990 emissions  
The parameter λ represents the firmness with which latecomers are pulled back toward 
their 1990 emission levels.   The value of λ implicit for Europe at the time the Kyoto 
Protocol was negotiated was sufficient to pull the EU-average below its 1990 level.   But 
to calibrate this formula, the most relevant countries are not European (since the 
Europeans are not latecomers), but rather the United States and Korea, since these are the 
only countries among those that did not commit themselves to Kyoto targets whose 
political leaders have said explicitly what targets they are willing to accept in the second 
budget period.  The parameters α and λ were chosen as the unique solutions to two 
simultaneous equations representing the US target in bills sponsored by Senator 
Lieberman and the Korean target (a flattening of emissions being interpreted here as 
holding absolute emissions in 2022 equal to 2007 levels).   The parameters then work out 
to  
α  = 0.2115 and λ = -0.3400 
Thus: 
   
LCF  = 0 .2115  -0 .3400  log(country’s current emissions / country’s 1990 emissions) 
28 
 
The third element is the Gradual Equalization Factor (GEF).  Even though 
developing countries under this plan benefit from delaying abatement efforts until after 
the rich countries have begun to act, and face  milder reduction requirements, they will 
still complain that it is the rich countries that originally created an environmental problem 
for which the poor will disproportionately bear the costs, rather than the other way 
around.  Such complaints are not unreasonable.  If we stopped with the first two factors, 
the richer countries would be left with the permanent right to emit more GHGs, every 
year in perpetuity, which seems unfair.    
In the short run, pointing out the gap in per capita targets is simply not going to 
alter the outcome.  The poor countries will have to live with it.  Calls for the rich 
countries to cut per capita emissions rapidly, in the direction of poor-country levels, 
ignore the fact that the economic costs of such a requirement would be so astronomical 
that no rich country would ever agree to it.  The same goes for calls for massive transfer 
payments from the rich to the poor (as in a call by the Group of 77 developing countries) 
When one is talking about a lead time of 50 to 100 years, however, the situation 
changes.  With time to adjust, the economic costs are not as impossibly high, and it is 
reasonable to ask rich countries to bear their full share of the burden.  Furthermore, over a 
time horizon this long some of the poor countries will in any case become rich (and 
possible vice versa). 
                                                 
28 If Korea were to back away from its president’s commitment in light of recent economic 
difficulties, but some other important middle-income country were to step up to the plate with 
explicit and specific numerical targets, then the calculation could be redone.       
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Accordingly, during each decade of the second half of the century, the formula 
includes an equity factor that moves per capita emissions in each country a small step in 
the direction of the global average.  This means downward in the case of the rich 
countries and upward in the case of the poor countries.  Asymptotically, the repeated 
application of this factor would eventually leave all countries with equal emissions per 
capita, although corresponding national targets would not necessarily converge fully by 
2100.
29   
The parameter (δ) for the speed of adjustment in the direction of the world 
average was initially chosen to match the rate at which the EU’s already-announced goals 
for 2045–2050 converge to the world average.   This number is δ=0.1 per decade, which 
is also very similar to the rate of convergence implicit in the goals set by the Lieberman 
bills for the United States during 2045–2050.  Thus: 
 
GEF  =  -0 .1 ( percentage gap between country’s lagged emissions per capita and the world’s). 
 
We expected to have to adjust the δ parameter, and indeed to add a fourth 
parameter for the “aggressiveness” of global emissions targets, in order to ensure that no 
single country was confronted with costs above our threshold constraint while still 
achieving a relevant global environmental goal in 2100.  By lucky coincidence, our initial 
method of computing δ satisfied the economic objectives and delivered year-2100 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations of 500 ppm.  In extensions of this research—where, for 
example, we try to hit a year-2100 goal of 450 ppm—we will have to adjust δ and 
probably will need to add an aggressiveness parameter, while also adjusting some 
countries’ start dates.  One possibility is to write an algorithm that searches over these 
parameters so as to find values that minimize the threshold of economic cost to any given 
country for any given year-2100 environmental goal. 
 
 
The formulas are summarized overall as follows: 
 
Log Target (country i, t) = log (BAU i, t ) – (PCF i, t ) + (LCF i, t ) + (GEF i, t ) , 
 
where the three factors (except in periods when set = 0 as indicated in Table 2) are given by: 
 
PCF i,t  = log (emission target EU 2008/ BAU EU 2008) 
            + 0.14 log (country i's income/cap t-1  / EU income/cap 2007); 
LCF i,t = 0.2115 - 0.3400 log (country i's  emissions t-1 / country i's emissions 1990). 





                                                 
29 Zhang (2008) and others, motivated by a rights-based approach, propose that countries “contract and 
converge” to targets that reflect equal emissions per capita.  The Greenhouse Development Rights approach 
of Baer et al. (2008), as extended by Cao (2008), emphasizes, from a philosophical standpoint, the 
allocation of emission rights at the individual level, though these authors apparently recognize that, in 
practice, individual targets would have to be aggregated and implemented at the national level.      18
The numerical emission target: paths that follow from the formulas 
 
Table 1, at the end of the chapter, reports the emissions targets produced by the 
formulas for each of eleven geographical regions, for every period between now and the 
end of the century.  We express the emission targets in several terms: 
•  in absolute tons (which is what ultimately matters for determining economic and 
environmental effects)  
•  in per capita terms (which is necessary for considering any issues of cross-country 
distribution of burden) 
•  relative to 1990 levels, which is the baseline used for Kyoto, and which remains 
relevant in our framework in the form of the Latecomer Catch-up term, and  
•  relative to the BAU path, which is important for evaluating the sacrifice asked of 
individual countries as they join the agreement in the early decades. 
 
The eleven regions are:  
EUROPE   =  Old Europe and    New Europe     
US  =  United States      KOSAU = Korea, South Africa, and Australia (3 coal-users) 
CAJAZ = Canada, Japan, and New Zealand  TE = Russia and other Transition Economies 
MENA = Middle East and North Africa  SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
SASIA= India and the rest of South Asia  CHINA = PRC 
EASIA = Smaller countries of East Asia  LACA = Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
In the first version of this exercise, China sells over a gigaton of carbon in 2040.  
Its permit sales fall off thereafter, as its target kicks in;  but Southeast Asian countries 
take its place, selling similar quantities in the last two decades of the century.   Southeast 
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa registered rather substantial economic gains toward the end 
of the century.
30  These gains reflect the benefits of being spared emissions cuts and 
being able to sell permits to richer countries during the period when those countries are 
already implementing reductions.  Some may judge it appropriate that poor countries 
register net economic gains from the abatement regime, since these are also the countries 
that will bear the heaviest burden from climate change in any case (by virtue of the fact 
that most are located nearer the equator and rely on large agricultural sectors).  But we 
judge the massive international transfers that are implicit in this scenario to be highly 
unsustainable politically.  They are not necessary in any case to satisfy the key economic 
and political constraints laid out at the beginning of this chapter.  
Accordingly, subsequent versions of the exercise assign Southeast Asia and 
Africa emission targets somewhat below BAU in the latter half of the century, with the 
result that they do not gain so much for the century as a whole.   In addition we move 
forward by ten years the date at which China is asked to take on below-BAU targets and 
by five years the date at which the  Middle East and North African (MENA) countries are 
asked to do so.   An additional reason for this change was to reduce the slackening in 
global targets—observable as a dip in the price of carbon—that would otherwise occur 
around 2035.  Results for the case where the four developing regions are given more 
stringent (earlier) targets are given in Tables 1 and 3b, and in the corresponding figures.   
Table 2 summarizes the dates at which all countries are asked to take on BAU targets and 
                                                 
30 Figures 2a-6a and Table 3a here; or Figures 2-8 and Tables 1 and 2 – especially Figure 7 -- in HPICA 
Discussion Paper 08-08, October 2008.   19
then reductions below BAU as governed by the different formula elements discussed 
previously (i.e., PRF, LCF, and then GEF).  
The United States, even more than other rich countries, is currently conspicuous 
by virtue of its high per capita emissions.
31  But its target path peaks after 2010 and then 
begins to decline.  Emissions in all the rich regions peak by 2015, and then start to 
decline.   Figure 2a reports aggregate targets for member countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).   It also shows actual emissions, 
which decline more gradually than the targets through 2045 because about 1 million 
metric tons (equal to 1 gigaton or Gt) of carbon permits are purchased on the world 
market, as is economically efficient, out of roughly 4 Gt.   (Permit sales to the richer 
countries exceed 1 Gt more often in the version where Southeast Asia and Africa are 
never asked for targets below BAU, and China and MENA start cutting emissions below 
BAU only at later dates.)   Though the OECD countries buy a substantial amount of 
reductions in the early decades, it is always less than half their total reductions.   The 
share falls off sharply in the second half of the century.  We assume no banking.   
 
 
Figure 2a: Emissions path for industrialized countries in the aggregate  
-- with later targets for developing countries 
(Note: Predicted actual emissions exceed caps by amount of permit purchases) 
                                                 

























Figure 2b: Emissions path for industrialized countries in the aggregate  
-- with earlier targets for developing countries 




Figure 3a: Emission paths for poor countries in the aggregate 
 -- with later targets for developing countries 
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Figure 3b: Emission paths for poor countries in the aggregate 
-- with earlier targets for developing countries 





Figure 4a: Emissions path for the world, in the aggregate  












































Figure 4b: Emissions path for the world, in the aggregate 
-- with earlier targets for developing countries 
 
Emissions in the non-rich countries, the TE group (transition economies), MENA, 
China, and Latin America all peak in 2040.
32  Emissions in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
smaller East Asian economies all remain at very low levels throughout the century.  
Figure 3a shows that among non-OECD countries overall, both emissions targets and 
actual emissions peak in 2040, with the latter substantially below the former.   In other 
words, the poor countries emit below their targets and sell permits to the rest.    
Total world emissions peak in 2045 at a little above 10 Gt, in the case where 
China and MENA are given the later starting points (Figure 4a). They peak ten years 
earlier, and without exceeding 10 Gt, in the case where China and MENA are given the 
earlier starting points (Firgure 4b).  In either case, emissions subsequently decline rather 
rapidly, falling below 5 Gt by 2090. Thanks to the post-2050 equalization formula, 
emissions per capita converge nicely in the long run, falling to below 1 ton per capita 





Economic and environmental consequences of the numerical targets, 
according to the WITCH model 
 
Estimating the economic and environmental implications of these targets is a 
complex task.  There are many fine models out there.
34   I was fortunate to link up with 
the WITCH model of FEEM (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, in Milan), as applied by 
Valentina Bosetti.  
                                                 
32 Figure 2 of HPICA Discussion Paper 08-08. 
33 Figure 2 of HPICA Discussion Paper 08-08. 
34 Researchers have applied a number of different models to estimate the economic and environmental 
effects of various specific emission paths; see, for example, Edmonds, Pitcher, Barns, Baron, and Wise 
(1992); Edmonds, Kim, McCracken, Sands, and Wise (1997);  Hammett (1999);  Manne, Mendelsohn, and 
Richels (1995); Manne and Richels (1997);  McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2006); and Nordhaus (1994, 2008).  
Weyant (2001) provides an explanation and comparison of different models. 




















WITCH (www.feem-web.it/witch) is an energy-economy-climate model 
developed by the climate change modeling group at FEEM. The model has been used 
extensively in the past three years to analyze the economic impacts of climate change 
policies. WITCH is a hybrid top-down economic model with energy sector 
disaggregation.  Those who might be skeptical of economists’ models on the grounds that 
“technology is the answer” can rest assured that technology is central to this model.   
(Economists are optimists when it comes to what new technologies might be called forth 
by a higher price for carbon, but pessimists when it comes to how much technological 
response to international treaties will occur absent an increase in price.)   The model 
features endogenous technological change via both experience and innovation processes. 
Countries are grouped in twelve regions, when Western Europe and Eastern Europe are 
counted separately, that cover the world and that strategically interact following a game 
theoretic set-up. The WITCH model and detailed structure are described in Bosetti et al. 
(2006) and Bosetti, Massetti, and Tavoni (2007). 
Original baselines in many models have been disrupted in recent years by such 
developments as stronger-than-expected growth in Chinese energy demand and the 
unexpected spike in world oil prices that culminated in 2008.   WITCH has been updated 
with more recent data and revised projections for key drivers such as population, GDP, 
fuel prices, and energy technology characteristics. The base calibration year has been set 
at 2005, for which data on socio-economic, energy, and environmental variables are now 





While economists trained in cost-benefit analysis tend to focus on economic costs 
expressed as a percentage of GDP, the politically attuned tend to focus at least as much 
on the predicted carbon price, which in turn has a direct impact on the prices of gasoline, 
home heating oil, and electric power.
35 
 
Figure 5a:  Price of Carbon Dioxide Rises Slowly Over 50 Years, then Rapidly 
 -- with later targets for developing countries 
 
                                                 
35 Frankel (1998).   This attitude may seem irrational to an economist; after all, price effects are largely 
redistributional.   But the public’s instincts may be correct insofar as predicted price effects are more 
reliable indicators of the degree of economic dislocation caused by a carbon policy than GDP losses, which 
are subject to larger modeling uncertainty.  Furthermore, distributional effects are key drivers of political 
support or opposition to a particular policy. 












































Figure 5b:  Price of Carbon Dioxide Rises Slowly Over 50 Years, then Rapidly 




Based on the WITCH simulations conducted for this analysis, the world price of 
CO2  surpasses $20 per ton in 2015, as Figure 5 shows.  It is then flat until 2030, as a 
consequence of the assumption that major developing countries do not take on major 
emission cuts before then.  The price even dips slightly before beginning a steep ascent, 
an undesirable feature.  It climbs steadily in the second half of the century, as the 
formula-based targets begin to bite seriously for developing countries.  Before 2050 the 
carbon price has surpassed $100 per ton of CO2.  Only toward the end of the century does 
it level off, at almost $700 per ton of CO2 in the case where some developing countries 
are spared early cuts, and at $800 per ton in the case where they are not spared. 
 
Most regions sustain economic losses that are small in the first half of the century 
—under 1 percent of GDP—but that rise toward the end of the century.
36  Given a 
positive rate of time discount, this is a good outcome.  No region in any period 
experiences costs in excess of our self-imposed threshold of 5 percent of GDP.   The 
estimated costs of the policy to each country-group, in present discounted value (PDV) 
                                                 
36 Figure 7 of HPICA Discussion Paper 08-08, omitted here to save space, illustrates economic costs, 
expressed as fractions of GDP, by region, for the case where the developing countries take on later targets..  
In this scenario, the highest decade costs are borne by China, just toward the end of the century, reaching 
4.1% of GDP in 2100.  (On the other hand the PDV of China’s cost is less than those of the United States 
and several other regions.)   The maximum GDP loss for the United States in any decade is 1.9%, and for 
the EU 1.4%, both occurring around 2080.      






































terms, are reported in Table 3a.   No country is asked to incur costs that are expected to 
exceed 1 percent of GDP over the century.    Only China’s costs creep up to 1.1% of 
GDP, when it takes on an earlier target, in Table 3b.    (All economic effects are gross of 
environmental benefits—that is, no attempt is made to estimate environmental benefits or 
net them out.)  
 
These costs of participation are overestimated, and increasingly so in the later 
decades, if the alternative to staying in the treaty one more decade is dropping out after 
seven or eight decades of participation.  The reason is that countries will have already 
substantially altered their capital stock and economic structure in a carbon-friendly 
direction.  The economic costs reported in the simulations and graphs treat the alternative 
to participation as never having joined the treaty in the first place. 
  
Figure 6 provides Gross World Product loss aggregated across across regions 
worldwide, and discounted to present value using a discount rate of 5 percent.  Total 
economic costs come to 0.24 percent of annual gross world product in the case where 
China and MENA start later and Southeast Asia and Africa are not given targets below 
BAU.  Overall policy costs come to 0.65 percent in the case where the former two start 
earlier, the latter two are given targets below BAU, and as a result the price of carbon hits 
$800 per ton. 
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Figure 6:  Loss of Aggregate Gross World Product by Budget Period, 2015-2100 






























The outcome of this plan in terms of cumulative emissions of GHGs is close to 
those of some models that build in environmental effects or science-based constraints, 
even though no such inputs were used here.  The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere 
stabilizes at 500 ppm in the last quarter of the century. 
 
 
Figure 7a:  
CO2 concentrations nearly achieve year-2100 concentration goal of 500 ppm  
-- with later targets for developing countries 
 
   
 
































Figure 7b: CO2 concentrations achieve year-2100 goal of 500 ppm  
-- with earlier targets for developing countries 
 
 
Based on the modeled concentration trajectory, global average temperature is 
projected to hit 3 degrees Celsius (°C) above pre-industrial levels at the end of the 
century, as opposed to almost 4°C under the BAU trajectory (Figure 8). The relationship 
between concentrations and temperature is, however, highly uncertain and depends on 
assumptions made about climate sensitivity. For this reason both figures are reported.  
(Many scientists and environmentalists prefer objectives that are substantially more 
ambitious.)   
 
 
Figure 8a: Rise in temperature under formula targets vs. BAU  































































Figure 8b: Rise in temperature under formula targets vs. Business as Usual  








  The analysis described here is only the beginning.   Several particular extensions 
are high priority for future research. 
 
Directions for future research 
 
  A first priority is to facilitate comparisons by tightening some parameters to see 
what it would take to hit a 2100 concentration level of 450 ppm or 2°C, which is the goal 
of some in the climate change community.   Our first attempts to do this impose costs on 
many countries, in some periods, that are substantially in excess of 5 percent of GDP.   
Figures 9 and 10 show the economic costs and concentration levels, respectively, that 
result from one such attempt.    These costs violate the economic/political constraint 
(even though concentrations have not quite come down to 450 ppm by 2100, but need 
another few decades to do so).  But we plan to try tinkering further with country strarting 
dates and formula parameters to see if it is possible to hit the 450 ppm target without any 
country bearing an unreasonable burden.   (In the other direction, we could also calibrate 
the adjustment so as to hit a 2100 target of 550 ppm, again facilitating comparisons. )  
Second, we could design an algorithm to search over values of some of the key 
parameters in such a way as to attain the same environmental goal— 450 or 500 
ppm —with minimum economic cost.   To continue emphasizing political 
feasibility, the objective could be to minimize the expected GDP loss for any 
country in any period, so as to minimize the incentive for any country to drop out.  
Or we could declare that we have already specified a sufficient political constraint 
(e.g., no loss to any country in any period above 5 percent of GDP), and proceed 
to a cost-benefit optimization exercise subject to those constraints.



















































































  Third, we could compare this set of emissions paths to other plans under 
discussion in the climate change policy community or being analyzed using other 
integrated assessment models.
37  Our hypothesis is that we could identify countries and 
periods in alternative pathways where we believe an agreement would be unlikely to hold 
up because its targets were not designed to limit economic costs for each country. 
Fourth, we could eventually design a user-friendly "game" that anybody could 
play, choosing different emissions targets for various countries over time, and 
discovering how easy it is to generate outcomes that are unacceptable, either in economic 
or environmental terms.   It would be a learning tool, hypothetically, for policymakers 
themselves.  Anyone who believes that the GHG abatement targets presented in this 
paper are insufficiently ambitious, or that the burden imposed on a particular country is 
too high, would be invited to try out alternatives for themselves.  Perhaps a character 
from an adversely impacted country would pop up on the screen and explain to the user 
how many millions of his compatriots have been plunged into dire poverty by the user’s 
policy choices. 
Fifth, we could take into account GHGs other than CO2. 
Sixth, we could implement constraints on international trading, along the lines 
that the Europeans have sometimes discussed.   Such constraints can arise either from a 
worldview that considers it unethical to pay others to take one’s medicine, or from a more 
cynical worldview that assumes international transfers via permit sales will only line the 
pockets of corrupt leaders.   Constraints on trading could take the form of quantity 
restrictions—for example, that a country cannot satisfy more than Z percent of its 
emissions obligation by international permit purchases.  Or eligibility to sell permits 
could be restricted to countries with a score in international governance ratings over a 
particular threshold, or to countries that promise to use the funds for green projects, or to 
those that have a track record of demonstrably meeting their commitments under the 
treaty. 
  
   The seventh possible extension of this research represents the most important step 
intellectually: to introduce uncertainty, especially in the form of stochastic growth 
processes.
38  The variance of the GDP forecasts at various horizons would be drawn from 
historical data.  We would adduce the consequences of our rule that if any country makes 
an ex post determination in any period that by staying in the treaty it loses more than 5 
percent of GDP, even though this had not been the expectation ex ante, that country will 
drop out.  At a first pass, we could keep the assumption that if one country pulls out, the 
entire system falls apart.  The goal would then be to design a version of the formulas 
framework that minimizes the probability of collapse.      
A more sophisticated approach would be to allow the possibility that the system 
could withstand the loss of one or two members.  We would try to account for the effect 
                                                 
37 For example, the CLEAR path suggested by Wagner et al. (2008, Table 2) proposes that by 2050 Russia 
has cut its emissions 30 percent below 1990 levels, China 46 percent below 2012 levels, India 8 percent 
above 2012 levels, and the other non-Annex I countries 23 percent below 2012.    The Global Development 
Rights approach of Baer et al. (2008) apparently proposes a US emissions target for 2025 that is 99 percent 
below its BAU path.   (These authors might say that their general approaches are more important than the 
specific parameter values by which they chose to illustrate them.  I would say the same of mine.) 
38 Among the papers that introduce uncertainty, McKibbin, Morris, and Wilcoxen (2008) address two of the 
most recently relevant unexpected developments: growth shocks in Asia and a global housing/equity crash.   31
of dropouts on remaining members, with some sort of application of game theory.   
Ideally we would also try to account from the start for the effect of possible future 
breakdown on expectations of firms deciding long-term investments.  Of course we could 
try other values of X besides 5 percent.    
The ultimate objective in making the model stochastic is to seek modifications of 
the policy framework that are robust, that protect against inadvertent stringency on the 
one hand—that is, a situation where the cost burden imposed on a particular country is 
much higher than expected—or inadvertent “hot air” on the other hand.  (“Hot air” refers 
to the possibility that targets are based on obsolete emission levels with the result that 
countries are credited for cutting tons that wouldn’t have been emitted anyway.)  Three 
possible modifications are promising.   First, we could allow for some degree of re-
adjustment to emission targets in the future, based solely on unexpected changes in the 
evolution in population and income.  (Note that adjustments would not be allowed on the 
basis of unexpected changes in emissions levels, for to do so would be to introduce moral 
hazard.)    Second, when the target for each decade is set, it could be indexed to GDP 
within that budget period. Perhaps the constant of proportionality in the indexation 
formula would equal 1, in which case it becomes an efficiency target, expressed in carbon 
emissions per unit of GDP. This approach would be much less vulnerable to within-
decade uncertainty.
39  A third possible feature that would make the policy more robust 
and that is strongly favored by many economists is an escape clause or safety valve that 
would limit costs in the event that mitigation proves more expensive than expected, 
perhaps with a symmetric floor on the price of carbon in addition to the usual ceiling. 
 
A politically credible framework 
           
  Our results suggest that the feasible set of emission target paths may be far more 
constrained than many modelers have assumed.   Lofty debates over the optimal discount 
rate or fair allocation rules might prove fairly irrelevant: For many discount rates or 
cross-country allocations, an international climate agreement could at some point during 
the century collapse altogether because it imposes unacceptably high costs on some 
countries, relative to defecting.  Each defection could raise costs on those who remain in 
the agreement, thereby increasing incentives for further defections and posing the 
prospect of a snow-balling effect.  Commitments to a century-long path that is highly 
likely to result in a collapse of the agreement after a few decades would not be believed 
today, and thus might evoke few actual steps toward achieving emission reductions in the 
near term. 
 
  The traditional integrated assessment result is that an economically optimal path 
entails relatively small increases in the price of carbon in the first half of the century and 
much steeper ones later.  It is interesting that a similar result emerges here purely from 
political considerations, with no direct input from cost/benefit calculations.
40  This broad 
                                                 
39 Lutter (2000). 
40 Integrated assessment models (IAMs) tend to give the result that the optimal path entails shallow cuts in 
earlier years, deeper cuts coming only later, because (for example) scrapping coal-fired power plants today 
is costly, while credibly announcing stringent goals that will take effect 50 years from now would be 
cheaper, by giving time to plan ahead.  Benefit-cost maximization, though obviously right in theory, is not   32
similarity of results for the aggregate path does not mean that the difference in 
approaches does not matter.  The framework analyzed here specifies the allocation of 
emission targets across countries in such a way that every country is given reason to feel 
that it is only doing its fair share and in such a way as to build trust as the decades pass.  
Without such a framework, announcements of distant future goals are not credible and so 
will not have the desired effects.   Furthermore, this framework—in providing for a 
decade-by-decade sequence of emission targets, each determined on the basis of a few 
principles and formulas—is flexible enough that it can accommodate, by small changes 
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Tables 
 
EUROPE = Old Europe + New Europe  KOSAU = Korea, South Africa + Australia (all coal-users) 
CAJAZ = Canada, Japan + New Zealand  TE = Russia and other Transition Economies 
MENA = Middle East + North Africa  SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
SASIA= India and the rest of South Asia  CHINA = PRC 
EASIA = Smaller countries of East Asia  LACA = Latin America + the Caribbean 
 
Table 1:  Emission Targets for each of 11 regions, according to the formulas 









EUROPE KOSAU CAJAZ  TE 
2005 1  unlimited unlimited  unlimited  unlimited unlimited  Unlimited 
2010 2  1.87591  0.88556 0.22849 0.39768  0.57841 0.83501 
2015 3  1.94157  0.83051 0.20819 0.42442  0.55573 0.91841 
2020 4  1.30761  0.77407 0.18929 0.44852  0.37796 0.86844 
2025 5  1.20331  0.69464 0.16579 0.39051  0.33085 0.81847 
2030 6  1.16946  0.62428 0.14504 0.34938  0.28811 0.78070 
2035 7  0.99089  0.55197 0.12448 0.30825  0.24575 0.74293 
2040 8  0.87106  0.47851 0.10454 0.29015  0.20451 0.70293 
2045 9  0.70636  0.40449 0.08551 0.27206  0.16478 0.66294 
2050 10 0.61066  0.32972 0.06741 0.23973  0.12656 0.61993 
2055 11 0.47577  0.26596 0.06289 0.20776  0.09307 0.57693 
2060 12 0.36873  0.21539 0.05837 0.17718  0.06799 0.53787 
2065 13 0.28016  0.17425 0.05385 0.14718  0.04866 0.49881 
2070 14 0.21128  0.14247 0.04933 0.11754  0.03470 0.45995 
2075 15 0.15125  0.11573 0.04481 0.10556  0.02353 0.42109 
2080 16 0.14177  0.11158 0.04029 0.10221  0.02185 0.38258 
2085 17 0.13229  0.10742 0.03577 0.09887  0.02017 0.34407 
2090 18 0.12280  0.10327 0.03125 0.09552  0.01849 0.32559 
2095 19 0.11332  0.09911 0.02673 0.09218  0.01681 0.30711 
2100 20 0.10384  0.09496 0.02221 0.08883  0.01513 0.25166 
Target per capita  
EMI/cap (ton C)  USA  EUROPE  KOSAU  CAJAZ  TE 
2005            
2010   5.95988  1.74333  1.91504  2.39863  1.63613 
2015   5.90006  1.62641  1.70965  2.55284  1.56933 
2020   3.81659  1.51259  1.52749  2.70695  1.06864 
2025   3.38963  1.35800  1.31882  2.37698  0.93998 
2030   3.19303  1.22401  1.14260  2.15334  0.82547 
2035   2.63145  1.08789  0.97673  1.92996  0.71156 
2040   2.25701  0.94989  0.82086  1.85037  0.59959 
2045   1.79058  0.81016  0.67433  1.77042  0.49047 
2050   1.51726  0.66735  0.53520  1.59314  0.38363 
2055   1.16172  0.54424  0.50273  1.40777  0.28689 
2060   0.88719  0.44588  0.47000  1.22254  0.21299 
2065   0.66602  0.36517  0.43706  1.03310  0.15485 
2070   0.49756  0.30246  0.40392  0.83854  0.11212 
2075   0.35381  0.24910  0.37053  0.76486  0.07719 
2080   0.33028  0.24366  0.33680  0.75175  0.07275   36
2085   0.30776  0.23819  0.30265  0.73761  0.06815 
2090   0.28606  0.23266  0.26792  0.72246  0.06339 
2095   0.26502  0.22702  0.23247  0.70622  0.05847 
2100   0.24445  0.22126  0.19615  0.68884  0.05338 
            
Target relative to 
1990 USA  EUROPE  KOSAU  CAJAZ  TE 
2005            
2010   1.29911  0.73379  0.98322  0.89166  0.61078 
2015   1.34458  0.68817  0.89587  0.95161  0.58683 
2020   0.90555  0.64141  0.81453  1.00565  0.39911 
2025   0.83331  0.57559  0.71343  0.87559  0.34937 
2030   0.80987  0.51729  0.62411  0.78337  0.30423 
2035   0.68621  0.45737  0.53567  0.69115  0.25950 
2040   0.60322  0.39650  0.44985  0.65057  0.21595 
2045   0.48917  0.33517  0.36795  0.60999  0.17400 
2050   0.42290  0.27321  0.29009  0.53751  0.13364 
2055   0.32948  0.22038  0.27064  0.46583  0.09828 
2060   0.25535  0.17847  0.25118  0.39726  0.07179 
2065   0.19402  0.14439  0.23173  0.33001  0.05139 
2070   0.14632  0.11805  0.21228  0.26354  0.03664 
2075   0.10475  0.09590  0.19283  0.23668  0.02485 
2080   0.09818  0.09246  0.17338  0.22918  0.02308 
2085   0.09161  0.08901  0.15393  0.22168  0.02130 
2090   0.08504  0.08557  0.13447  0.21418  0.01953 
2095   0.07848  0.08213  0.11502  0.20668  0.01775 
2100   0.07191  0.07868  0.09557  0.19918  0.01598 
            





EUROPE KOSAU CAJAZ  TE 
2005            
2010    1  0.82136 1.07575 1  1  1 
2015    0.93718  0.72218 0.90219 1  0.90573 0.97 
2020    0.58125  0.64149 0.75724 1  0.59071 0.9047 
2025    0.49896  0.55440 0.61868 0.83061  0.50236 0.81418 
2030    0.45683  0.48348 0.51106 0.71465  0.42927 0.7498 
2035    0.36735  0.41717 0.41911 0.61113  0.36202 0.69396 
2040    0.30826  0.35443 0.33976 0.5613  0.29957 0.64211 
2045    0.23974  0.29457 0.27063 0.51626  0.24096 0.59511 
2050    0.19949  0.23665 0.20943 0.44799  0.18517 0.54942 
2055    0.15017  0.18851 0.19233 0.38312  0.13622 0.50533 
2060    0.1121  0.15067 0.17483 0.32055  0.09942 0.4618 
2065    0.0824  0.12053 0.15835 0.26209  0.0711  0.42076 
2070    0.06037  0.09764 0.14270 0.20668  0.05067 0.38221 
2075    0.04218  0.07874 0.12774 0.18386  0.03436 0.34573 
2080    0.03874  0.07550 0.11333 0.17688  0.03191 0.3113 
2085    0.03557  0.07241 0.09937 0.17042  0.02947 0.27831 
2090    0.03266  0.06960 0.08588 0.16462  0.02708 0.26278 
2095    0.0302  0.06766 0.07314 0.16046  0.02494 0.24922 
2100    0.02781  0.06572 0.06049 0.15639  0.02273 0.20576 
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Table 1 continued 
 
Target Absolute  
(tons C, thousand 
millions)    MENA SSA  SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA 
2005  1  unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited 
2010  2  0.51177 unlimited  0.41288 1.83009 0.39464 0.49779 
2015  3  0.58766 unlimited  0.51088 2.08354 0.48358 0.58216 
2020  4  0.65678 unlimited  0.63579 2.41191 0.57966 0.67417 
2025  5  0.72000 0.11618 0.78210 2.78142 0.67840 0.77043 
2030  6  0.65952 0.13962 0.94549 2.57781 0.77640 0.86843 
2035  7  0.60771 0.16584 1.12277 2.27298 0.87116 0.75977 
2040  8  0.60473 0.19496 1.31222 2.11931 0.96049 0.71027 
2045  9  0.60176 0.22704 1.50976 1.94741 1.04308 0.66078 
2050  10  0.59414 0.25983 1.40956 1.85137 0.86258 0.63716 
2055  11  0.58653 0.26227 1.38141 1.79709 0.72852 0.57931 
2060  12  0.57226 0.26470 1.35326 1.74282 0.66888 0.51555 
2065  13  0.55800 0.26714 1.28759 1.68854 0.61368 0.42716 
2070  14  0.52633 0.26957 1.21498 1.63427 0.55429 0.37107 
2075  15  0.49466 0.26753 1.11969 1.58000 0.51749 0.36319 
2080  16  0.47001 0.24386 0.94502 1.52572 0.48068 0.35531 
2085  17  0.44535 0.23956 0.87403 1.47145 0.45211 0.34742 
2090  18  0.40085 0.22707 0.73042 1.41717 0.42353 0.33954 
2095  19  0.35634 0.22707 0.73042 1.36290 0.38115 0.33166 
2100  20  0.35634 0.22707 0.73042 1.30863 0.33877 0.32377 
          
Target per capita  
EMI/cap  (ton  C)  MENA SSA  SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA 
2005          
2010    2.36325   unlimited  0.30372 2.65865 0.70466 
2015    2.39601   unlimited  0.36574 2.86261 0.81691 
2020    2.10619   unlimited  0.44466 3.15812 0.93292 
2025    1.86509 0.61237 0.05850 0.53767 3.49364 1.04729 
2030    1.68639 0.50976 0.06711 0.64429 3.12618 1.15753 
2035    1.53171 0.43006 0.07666 0.76506 2.67853 1.26318 
2040    1.39177 0.39474 0.08710 0.90017 2.44300 1.36319 
2045    1.26822 0.36505 0.09856 1.04778 2.20932 1.45799 
2050    1.15372 0.33747 0.11028 0.99380 2.07893 1.19443 
2055    1.05095 0.31442 0.10931 0.98961 2.00366 1.00215 
2060    0.96373 0.29188 0.10881 0.98516 1.93479 0.91666 
2065    0.88344 0.27300 0.10879 0.95269 1.87182 0.84028 
2070    0.80924 0.24903 0.10925 0.91379 1.81427 0.76053 
2075    0.73967 0.22822 0.10839 0.85613 1.76170 0.71361 
2080    0.67432 0.21319 0.09923 0.73469 1.71366 0.66818 
2085    0.61160 0.20025 0.09834 0.69100 1.66976 0.63538 
2090    0.58662 0.18015 0.09448 0.58731 1.62959 0.60358 
2095    0.56369 0.16138 0.09621 0.59741 1.59275 0.55244 
2100    0.47295 0.16396 0.09843 0.60776 1.55886 0.50085 
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Target relative to 
1990  MENA SSA  SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA 
2005          
2010    2.67631 14.41159  unlimited  0.49685 14.52452  1.33324 
2015    2.94363 16.54868  unlimited  0.61478 16.53603  1.63372 
2020    2.78346 18.49511  unlimited  0.76509 19.14214  1.95831 
2025    2.62330 20.27541  0.57515 0.94116 22.07476  2.29189 
2030    2.50224 18.57228  0.69119 1.13777 20.45881  2.62297 
2035    2.38119 17.11319  0.82099 1.35111 18.03953  2.94311 
2040    2.25299 17.02942  0.96515 1.57909 16.81995  3.24490 
2045    2.12480 16.94566  1.12396 1.81680 15.45561  3.52392 
2050    1.98697 16.73121  1.28630 1.69622 14.69338  2.91413 
2055    1.84914 16.51675  1.29836 1.66234 14.26264  2.46123 
2060    1.72395 16.11511  1.31041 1.62847 13.83189  2.25973 
2065    1.59877 15.71346  1.32247 1.54945 13.40114  2.07324 
2070    1.47421 14.82157  1.33452 1.46207 12.97040  1.87260 
2075    1.34965 13.92968  1.32442 1.34740 12.53965  1.74826 
2080    1.22622 13.23548  1.20724 1.13720 12.10891  1.62393 
2085    1.10279 12.54129  1.18594 1.05178 11.67816  1.52738 
2090    1.04355 11.28795  1.12410 0.87897 11.24742  1.43084 
2095    0.98431 10.03461  1.12410 0.87897 10.81667  1.28767 
2100    0.80660 10.03461  1.12410 0.87897 10.38592  1.14451 
         
Target relative to 
BAU  MENA SSA  SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA 
2005   1  1  1 1 1  1 
2010   1  1 1 1 1  1 
2015   1  1 1 1 1  1 
2020   1  1 1 1 1  1 
2025   1  1 1 1 1  1 
2030   0.84599  1 1 0.81467  1  1 
2035   0.72519  1 1 0.64230  1  0.78628 
2040   0.67434  1 1 0.54438  1  0.66805 
2045   0.62911  1 1 0.46150  1  0.57042 
2050    0.58430 0.99135 0.82410 0.41023 0.77162 0.50921 
2055    0.54408 0.87452 0.72261 0.37592 0.61422 0.43097 
2060    0.49920 0.77259 0.63130 0.34285 0.53174 0.35762 
2065    0.45884 0.68832 0.54289 0.31506 0.46395 0.2777 
2070    0.40912 0.61854 0.46904 0.29151 0.40179 0.22726 
2075    0.36464 0.55153 0.40073 0.27137 0.36249 0.21065 
2080    0.32977 0.45580 0.31732 0.25398 0.32782 0.1962 
2085    0.29861 0.40966 0.27847 0.23879 0.30230 0.18365 
2090    0.25850 0.35937 0.22346 0.22562 0.28003 0.17309 
2095    0.22461 0.33996 0.21831 0.21508 0.25333 0.16574 
2100    0.22041 0.32412 0.21513 0.20550 0.22748 0.15933   39
Table 2 :   
Years when countries are to commit to targets at BAU and then below BAU 
 
 
July 2008 Version (a)- 
Harvard (500 ppm CO2)  --
with later targets for 
developing countries  USA  EUROPE  KOSAU  CAJAZ  TE  MENA SSA  SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA 
year when they are 
assumed to commit to 
TARGET or BAU  2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010  2040 2010 2010 2010 2010 
year when they are 
assumed to commit to 
TARGET (PCF & LCF) 
never above BAU  2015  2010 2025 2015 2015 2030  -  2050 2040 -  2035 
year when GEF kicks in  2055  2055 2055 2055 2055 2055  -  2055 2055 -  2055 
year when PCF and LCF 
drop out  2055  2055 2075 2055 2090 2100  - 2095 2095 - 2080 
per cap GDP 2010 K$  
per person (2005 USD)  46.67889  32.57178 17.12039 40.11022 4.833032 4.490123 0.635535 0.891818 2.490698 1.93462 5.606108 
per cap GDP year of 1
st  
cut, K$ (2005 $) 51.60516  32.57178 23.52091 44.76398 5.995228 8.103633     6.095896 12.9065    14.67883 
per cap GDP 2100 (with 
policy) K$  (2005 $) 146.6341  125.8841 71.33147 125.4985 39.33137 38.16667 7.960843 22.07702 52.04833 21.56599 63.75807 
per cap GDP 2100 (with-
out policy) K$  (2005 $) 149.4399  126.6184 72.33748 126.707 39.63715 39.0211 7.447119 22.01989 54.2875 18.06219 65.41224 
per capita emissions  
2010 5.959875  2.540625 3.33309 3.488708 2.361965 1.448415 0.072677 0.251596 1.346227 0.573311 0.888837 
per cap emissions,  
year of first cut  6.295571  2.540625 3.739874 3.690558 2.551435 1.683975     0.72597 2.670631    1.401099 
per cap emissions 2100  
(with policy)  0.775217  0.641313 0.772061 0.941758 1.284856 0.73267 0.100678 0.235541 0.889086 0.289966 0.672001 
per cap emissions 2100  
(without policy)  8.789477  4.222235 5.01663 5.161716 4.315193 3.038271 0.322343 1.471802 5.298569 1.773993 3.004225 
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Table 2:    
Years when countries are to commit to targets at BAU and then below BAU (continued) 
January 2009 Version (b)- 
Poznan (500 ppm CO2 only) 
-- with earlier targets for 
developing countries  USA EUROPE  KOSAU  CAJAZ  TE  MENA  SSA  SASIA  CHINA  EASIA  LACA 
year when they are 
assumed to commit to 
TARGET or BAU  2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010  2040 2010 2010 2010 2010 
year when they are 
assumed to commit to 
TARGET (PCF & LCF) 
never above BAU  2015  2010 2025 2015 2015 2025  2050 2050 2030 2050 2035 
year when GEF kicks in  2055  2055 2055 2055 2055 2055  2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 
year when PCF  
and LCF drop out  2055 2055 2075 2055 2090 2100  2100 2095 2070 2100 2080 
per capita GDP 2010 K$ 






35 0.891818 2.490698 1.93462 5.606108 
per capita GDP year of 






87 6.095896 8.242312 9.356524 14.67883 
per capita GDP 2100 (with 






05 22.06178 53.39906 18.25157 64.29782 
per capita GDP 2100 






19 22.01989 54.2875 18.06219 65.41224 






77 0.251596 1.346227 0.573311 0.888837 
per capita Emissions year 






71 0.72597 2.156224 1.255288 1.401099 
per capita emissions 2100 






17 0.218605 0.840643 0.27635 0.633104 
per capita emissions 2100 






43 1.471802 5.298569 1.773993 3.004225 
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Table 3a:  Implied Economic Cost of Emission Targets for each of 11 regions  
with later targets for developing countries         
 PDV at discount rate = 5%.   Expressed as per cent of GDP 
USA  OLDEURO  NEWEURO  KOSAU  CAJAZ  TE  MENA  SSA  SASIA  CHINA 
0.55% 0.18%  0.77% 0.22% 0.31% 0.98% 0.62% -1.33% -0.35% 0.50% 
 
Table 3b:  Implied Economic Cost of Emission Targets for each of 11 regions  
with earlier targets for developing countries         
PDV at discount rate = 5%.   Expressed as per cent of GDP 
USA  WEURO  EEURO  KOSAU  CAJAZ  TE  MENA  SSA  SASIA  CHINA  EASIA  LACA 
0.69%  0.26%  0.84%  0.26%  0.46% 0.57% 0.62% -0.32% -0.74% 1.14% -0.47% 0.57% 
 